Today, Priceline. The Priceline Group has expanded rapidly in recent years with the acquisition of sites like Kayak and Booking. By The Washington Post. More in Business. Looking for the Halloween Reading Chart? A long time ago, I wrote a post on another blog about how to use Name Your Own Price to get a cheap hotel room in Priceline. Three years later, I still love it. In fact, I just used it three week ago when I went down to Atlanta for a blog conference.
Priceline speaks my love language. This list is not going to be hundred percent accurate! This is just to give you a reasonably good idea of what kind of hotels you have a shot at getting in any particular zone or star level. Once you have a feel for the hotels in the area, I usually go back to the main list for the city and see what people have been paying for hotels:. You also need to put in the name of the person the reservation will be in. You can wait 24 hours and start over.
Hmmm, I was just about to book our Christmas hotel, but I might need to look into this. I am definitely a pay-for-convenience person, but this could be worth the hassle. Strategic consumer behavior arises from repeat bidding in NYOP selling. Multiple bidding has received little attention with conflicting results. Under this scenario: a double bid scenario can be attractive to customers different from Fay's earlier results under more restrictive conditions.
More recently, Fay and Laran formulate an N period problem where bids are made at each period. However, given the computational complexity they focus on a restricted set of bidding patterns. With very few exceptions for example, Terwiesch et al, and Wilson and Zhang, most of the analytical modeling for NYOP options makes heavy use of uniformity assumptions. In particular, customers' reserve prices and opinions of the retailer's threshold are generally assumed to be uniform random variables.
In many ways, one might consider these assumptions to be the weakest part of the literature and, possibly, a fruitful area for future research. In general, for instance, it seems to be a very strong assumption to assume that reservation prices are uniform.
For instance, consider a population of made up of students, professors and businesspeople bidding for hotel rooms on an NYOP channel. In this case, a tri- modal distribution would seem most appropriate. Should this be the case, the literature on NYOP channels is not particularly informative. As pointed out by Wilson and Sorochuk assumption of a uniform distribution function can impose considerable limitations on the type of population being modeled.
The issue of dynamically changing NYOP auctions presents some particularly challenging technical problems. Fay and Laran take some first steps in allowing the threshold to change over time. Generally, the analytical models assume that customers are rational in an economics sense.
For instance, the assumption is often made that customers seek to maximize expected profit or maximize their surplus. A number of studies indicate that customers do not necessarily behave in the manner assumed by these models. This indicates that, in developing models, it can make sense to assume a wide variety of behavior among consumers.
Much of the NYOP literature has failed to incorporate competition and the resulting opacity into the optimal use of opaque selling. NYOP selling allows a firm producing a branded product to simultaneously sell it as a commodity to price sensitive consumers.
Different opaque mechanisms offer differing levels of opacity with Hotwire. The recent success of all pay auctions like Swoopo. This is further evidenced by newer offerings, such as PriceWhispers. Anderson, C. Interfaces 39 4 : — Article Google Scholar.
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You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Correspondence to Chris K Anderson. Reprints and Permissions. Name-your-own price auction mechanisms — Modeling and future implications. J Revenue Pricing Manag 10, 32—39 Download citation. Received : 04 October Revised : 04 October Published : 19 November Issue Date : 01 January Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:.
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